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but to support the Commander-in-chief in his view that the action proposed was out of proportion to the gravity of the incident.
7. The result of this intervention might have been serious, as there was a possibility of the time-limit expiring without any decision being reached as to the action to be taken.
8. In order to obviate confusion and misunderstanding in similar circumstances the Commander-in-chief and I discussed, during my visit to Shanghai, the procedure which should be followed in the event of any future incident, and I have the honour to enclose copies of the correspondence which passed between us.
9. The point of view of the Commander-in-chief is that Admiralty telegrams Nos. 812-815 are instructions from His Majesty's Government to him. In other words, the responsibility of deciding whether any retaliatory action is to be taken by British armed forces in any part of China and the nature of such action is his alone; and his obligations towards me, whilst keeping in close touch with me as he always has most loyally done in the past, is to inform me at once of his decisions. But the decisions are his and not mine. My own view as regards responsibility for deciding upon action under the Admiralty instructions tallies with that of the Commander-in-chief. There can be no doubt in view of the precise instructions sent to him by His Majesty's Government. At the same time retaliatory action taken in one area not only may, but almost inevitably will, have a very distinct political reaction elsewhere, in China, the whole of which is my province, and I felt bound to emphasise my strong view that where time permitted I should be given an opportunity of concurring in or commenting on any proposed action before it was finally decided upon.
10. The upshot of this correspondence was the issue to consular officers of the circular which forms the last enclosure to this despatch.
11. I trust that the conversations between the Commander-in-chief and myself in Shanghai, and the working arrangement now embodied in the circular to consuls, will have avoided the possibility of any future contretemps. At the same time the fact remains that the Commander-in-chief has been made responsible for decisions which may involve very serious political repercussions. No one welcomes more than myself the liberty of action which has been given to him, and it appears to me that the successful termination of the "Lungshan incident is itself a justification of the instructions issued. At the same time, while I realise that cases may occur which require prompt action and will not allow time for full consultation with the Legation, I must naturally rely on being consulted in advance in all cases where time permits, for, so far as political matters are concerned, the ultimate responsibility in China is mine. This point, I know, is fully realised by the Commander-in-chief himself, with whom I had the frankest and most friendly conversations on this matter; whilst therefore I have felt bound to draw the attention of His Majesty's Government to the position which does in fact involve some departure from the normal rules of procedure. I am perfectly confident that in practice Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt and I will continue to work in closest harmony and will succeed in over- coming any difficulties which the anomalies of the situation might otherwise create. 12. In addressing to you this despatch, I wish specifically to disclaim any desire to raise a contentious issue. Knowing Admiral Tyrwhitt's views as I do, I am quite content to leave matters as they are. At the same time I have felt bound to point
out the anomalies of the position in case any unforeseen difficulties should arise in the future, though I hasten to add that I do not anticipate that they will do so. The really important thing is that the Commander-in-chief should have received the instructions that he has, and that consequently the British authorities on the spot are in a position to deal with future incidents in a manner more conducive to the national dignity than has been the case in the past.
I have, &c.
MILES W. LAMPSON.
Sir.
Enclosure 1 in No. 1.
Vice-Admiral Tyrwhitt to Sir M. Lampson.
THE Lungshan" incident.
H.M.S.
<<
Hawkins," at Shanghai. May 24, 1927.
I have the honour to forward, for your information, a summary of the telegrams recently exchanged in connection with the firing on the British steamship "Lungshan" near Dane Island on the 16th May, 1927.
2. I am of opinion that the affair has been sadly mishandled and, further, that the Consul-General, Canton, and the Senior Naval Officer, Hong Kong, between them, exceeded their authority.
3. As you are aware, the Admiralty, in their telegrams to me, Nos. 812 to 815 inclusive, communicated the decision of His Majesty's Government to confer on me certain discretionary powers in regard to retaliatory measures. At the same time I received instructions to repeat those telegrams to the Governor, Hong Kong, as well as to you.
I was careful not to repeat those telegrams to any naval authority whatever, since it was quite plain that each incident, or case of outrage, would have to be carefully considered on its merits, and mine alone was the responsibility of deciding whether, in view of the carefully drafted rules laid down by His Majesty's Govern- ment. I was justified in taking action on my own authority.
It never occurred to me that anyone else would take action on the authority of those telegrams without my knowledge or consent, and before this incident occurred I had decided to issue a printed memorandum on the subject (dated the 18th May, 1927, copy attached), which lays down the action to be taken on such occasions.
As will be seen, the Consul-General, Canton, was in possession of those Admiralty telegrams, or at any rate of No. 812, and appears to have considered that he was entitled to take action on the strength of the instructions contained therein.
With this, of course. I cannot possibly agree.
4.
5.
The first report of the incident was very indefinite: it gave no indication of the volume of fire which had been directed at the ship, nor did it include that vitally important information that there were Matshed Barracks situated at the very spot at which the incident occurred. As it turns out, the situation would appear to have been one of the easiest possible kind to deal with, namely, by the immediate bombardment of those Matshed Barracks by H.M.S. "Cicala on her return passage with the steamship "Lungshan a few hours later.
་་
As it was, everybody there seems to have concentrated on the idea of the capture of the Bogue Forts and Dane Island Defences as the only possible form of sanction, a proposal which I know you agree is entirely out of proportion to the gravity of the offence, and which does not conform to the rules laid down by His Majesty's Govern- ment in the Admiralty telegrams above quoted.
6. Since very rapid communication can always be established with me through any of His Majesty's ships. I should be grateful. provided you concur with the fore- going, if you would issue instructions which will prevent a repetition of such action on the part of consular officers, and ensure that reports of such incidents are sufficiently full and detailed to enable the situation to be adequately appreciated. I have, &c.
R. Y. TYRWHITT, Vice-Admiral.
Commander-in-Chief.
Annex (1) to Enclosure 1.
"1
The "Lungshan ' Incident-Summary of Erents.
1. On the 16th May both the Consul-General, Canton, and the Senior Naval Officer, Hong Kong, reported that the British steamer Lungshan (Hong Kong and Macao Steamboat Company), when passing through Collinson Reach, near Dane Island, at about 0700, had been fired at (with rifles) by soldiers from the shore. The ship was hit, but there were no casualties. The volume of fire, .e., one or two shots or hundreds, was not stated. On her return trip the ship was escorted past the forts by Cicala without incident. The consul-general reported that he
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